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Commentaries
Persuasion in the Courtroom
William C. Costopoulos*
INTRODUCTION
Persuasion is defined as "an act of influencing the minds of others by
arguments or reasons, by appeals to both feeling and intellect; it is the
art of leading another man's will to a particular choice, or course of
conduct." No one doubts this is what trial lawyers do every day in the
courtroom-and that is what this article is about.
Much literature has been written on this subject, a literature which
reflects many new insights about human behavior and communication.
In experimental social psychology, persuasion is one of the major areas
of specialization. Volumes have been written on propaganda and com-
munications, psychological warfare, advertising and industry, scientific
mind-changing, religious conversions, confessions and indoctrination,
and brain washing. Some of the questions raised in this literature have
a profound impact on the art of persuasion in the courtroom. For
example, why are some trial lawyers perceived as highly trustworthy by
some people, yet, at the same time, untrustworthy by others? When both
sides of an argument are presented, will the arguments heard first have
any advantage over those heard last? Is persuasion in the guise of an
emotional appeal as effective as a rational communication? What
characteristics of recipients affect their persuasibility? Though the voice
is the most frequently used channel of communication in the court-
room, is it the most effective? If not, what is? Charts? Films? Drama?
This article is an attempt to answer these questions in light of the
-experiments in social psychology on persuasion, with support from the
knowledge other sciences have provided us. Also, these issues will be
-discussed from the vantage point of the trial lawyer.., who may have
never conducted. an experiment in social psychology, but who is, never-
theless, a master of the art.
* A.B. Dickinson College; J.D. Duquesne University. Mr. Costopoulos is a former
Editor-in-Chief of the Duquesne Law Review and is presently engaged in graduate legal
studies at Harvard University.
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: Though it is unlikely that a trial lawyer would object to a concen-
trated study of the art of persuasion, other readers may. They may fear
that persuasion is a form of propaganda and that such emphasis will
interfere with having legal controversies decided on the merits. More-
over, it may be argued that this study can degenerate into a study of the
techniques of shysterism. After all, it can overcome a bad cause, destroy
a good one, incarcerate the innocent, and free the guilty. To them I
offer an affirmation. Their fear is justified and their argument is
tenable. However, ihere are at least two safeguards which keep the
inherent dangers of the art of persuasion in balance.
The very nature of our adversary system is the first one, which in
essence can be stated as follows:
Justice is found experimentally to be best promoted by the opposite
efforts of practised and ingenious men, presenting to the selection
of an impartial judge the best arguments for the establishment and
explanation of truth. If he comes then under such an arrangement,
the decided duty of an advocate is to use all the arguments in his
power to defend the cause he has adopted, and to leave the effect of
those arguments to the judgment of others.'
A typical case arises in our adversary system when the State charges a
defendant, and the defendant hires an attorney. The State, as the
representative of the people, has probable cause to believe the defendant
committed a crime, and the burden of proving it beyond a reasonable
doubt. To the defendant, a court trial is serious business. For weeks,
perhaps months, possibly years, he has thought of nothing else. The
future trial is a millstone around his neck, ever present with him at all
his leisure moments, at his work, at his home, in his dreams. He thinks
and talks of little else. His attorney is his advocate, his hope, and to
some, desperately more. He wants a partisan-one who will represent
him and fight for him with all the technique and knowledge humanly
possible. It is the advocate's duty to do this, to fight, to argue, to devise
the best arguments he can in his client's favor; he must step forward as
the client's representative and persuade the judge and jury with the
same allowance that would be made were the party himself the pleader.
However, and it must be emphasized, this does not mean his role is to
save his client at all hazards and costs to others, reckless of all conse-
quence. No system in the world would work if this were the case. Nor is
it the advocate's role to consider the guilt or innocence of his client. The
1. F. WELLMAN, DAY IN COURT 78 (1931).
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determination of what happened, and the determination of guilt or
innocence, is the sole province of the jury, and if none, the judge-never
is it the consideration of the advocate.
Prosecutor against defense counsel, plaintiff versus defendant-with
the determination of guilt or innocence left to an independent arbiter
-is the essence of our system. The adversary system is painstaking, slow,
expensive, even a nuisance, but if history educates, it is the fairest system
known.
The second safeguard to persuasion in the courtroom is the integrity
and character of the source-the lawyer. These two qualities are im-
plicit in the definition of effective persuasion, for juries need to be
convinced of the honesty of purpose and truthfulness of the advocate.
Otherwise, they will look upon him with suspicion and distrust his
assertions; however great his ability, and brilliant his oratory, they will
listen to him as a mere actor, with feigned emotions, and his argument
as an ingenious fallacy. It has often been said that the quality that wins
more clients than eloquence is integrity, and that "integrity without
genius is better than genius without integrity," that "honesty is wisdom
as well as virtue," equally in the profession of the law as in all other
pursuits.2 An established reputation for integrity and character not
merely predisposes a jury in an advocate's favor, but makes them listen
since they know that whatever such a man says, he means. They are
inclined to follow his arguments carefully, since they are confident that
all is fairly, candidly, and truthfully conducted. Juries and judges can
certainly be persuaded, but seldom are they deceived.
The format of this article will follow the traditional Smith, Lasswell,
and Casey formula: 3 "Who (THE SOURCE) says what (THE MES-
SAGE) to whom (THE RECIPIENTS) through which medium (THE
CHANNEL) with what effect?" In a courtroom, the source of a com-
munication is the lawyer (and the witnesses); the message is the presenta-
tion of the evidence; the recipients are the judge and jury; and the
channel is the means of communication.
Section I focuses on "The Source." It summarizes the literature on
prestige suggestion and reviews the effect of both relevant and objec-
tively irrelevant aspects of the communicator's credibility; the physical
characteristics of a communicator are also considered.
In Section II, the order and manner of presenting a message is dis-
2. Id. at 53.
3. B. SMITH, H. LAswELL, and R. CASEY, PROPAGANDA, COMMUNICATION, AND PUBLIC
OPINION (1946).
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cussed in detail. The questions raised here relate to the impact of a
communication that is heard first vis-h-vis one that is heard last (Which
delivery has the advantage?), and to the manner of presenting a mean-
ingful and convincing delivery (How can one presentation be more
effective than another?). In this section, the principal findings of ex-
perimental research on persuasion are considered. In addition there is
a condensed review of what trial lawyers consider fundamental to an
effective opening, examination, and closing of a case. And finally, the
impact of an emotional appeal as opposed to a rational presentation is
analyzed.
Section III examines those factors of persuasibility inherent in
recipients, and the differences between judge and jury as a legal audi-
ence.4 Discussed are both inherent and induced factors related to
gullibility.
Section IV evaluates the channels, or means of communication, with
emphasis on those used in the courtroom. Some definite conclusions
have been arrived at by trial lawyers, and these are examined in light of
the findings of experimental social psychologists.
I. THE SOURCE
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the
speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe
good men more fully and more readily than others; this is true
generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true when exact
certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.
It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric,
that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes
nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary his character
may be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.
Aristotle5
One would predict that the impact of communication attributed to a
highly respected source would be greater than one attributed to a lesser
source. This would be common sense-the assumption being that of
"prestige suggestion." Prestige suggestion can be defined as follows: a
given communication will induce a greater change in the opinions of an
4. Much of the research considered here reflects the influence of Harry Kalven, Jr. and
Hans Zeisel, who have done an empirical study of the American Jury. H. KALVEN JR.
and H. ZEISEL, THE AEaRaicAN JuRy (1966).
5. Aristotle as quoted in SaRYam, THE ART oF ADVOCACy 140-41 (1954).
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audience if attributed to a source having high credibility rather than to
a source having low credibility.6
Much of the work on prestige suggestion deals with the characteristics
of the communicator and his role in society. Typical of these studies was
one by Arnett, Davidson, and Lewis, in which attitude statements were
presented to graduate students for their opinions before and after the
statements were attributed to a credible source. Their results seem to
be dictated by common sense. The student's own positions on each item
changed in the direction attributed to the credible source.7 A finding by
Bowden, Caldwell, and West is like the one of Arnett and his colleagues.
Statements proposing solutions to the economic problem of an ap-
propriate monetary standard for the United States were more often
approved when the source of the statements was identified as an edu-
cator or a businessman, less often when the source was identified as a
minister.8
The more credible the source, the more persuasive the appeal is a
finding which comes as no surprise. But what makes a source credible?
What makes a source reliable? Why are some speakers perceived as
highly trustworthy by some people, yet, at the same time, untrustworthy
by others?
One obvious variable controlling source credibility is physical ap-
pearance. In an experiment conducted by Mills and Aronson, it was
confirmed that a physically attractive communicator is more influential
than one who is unattractive, even when the audience has been made
aware of the communicator's persuasive intent.9 There is no logic
behind such a finding, but it will be frequently found throughout this
area that logic is not necesarily the guide. For example, the concept of
"charisma", whatever that is, defies any logical explanation. Yet, it
exists; it is a cause of influence and admiration; and it is the only ex-
planation in some instances why some people are more influential than
others.
Another variable that influences source credibility is implied in the
consistency hypothesis. This means that when a speaker is placed in a
psychologically inconsistent position-where his public behavior is
6. E. Aronson and B. Golden, The Effect of Relevant and Irrelevant Aspects of Com-
municator Credibility on Opinion Change, 30 J. OF PERSONALITY 135 (1962).
7. C. Arnett, H. Davidson, and H. Lewis, Prestige as a Factor in Attitude Change, 16
SocIAL. Soc. REs. 49-55 (1931).
8. A. Bowden, F. Caldwell, and G. West, A Study in Prestige, 40 AMER. J. SOCIOL. 193-
204 (1934).
9. J. Mills and E. Aronson, Opinion Change as a Function of the Communicator's
Attractivenes and Desire to Influence, 1 PEas. Soc. PSYCHOL. 173-77 (1965).
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counter to his private beliefs-he will experience psychological dis-
comfort. 10 Often, the discomfort tends to be manifested in some overt
act to which an audience can respond. For example, when an otherwise
credibly perceived communicator defends a position not his own, he
may stumble over his words "hem" and "haw", and in general lose his
air of authority and his persuasiveness along with it. In an experiment
conducted by Greenberg and Tannebaum, a writer was given informa-
tion which attacked his beliefs; he was then asked to compose something
in support of that information. As could be predicted from the "con-
sistency hypothesis," he took longer to write the article and made more
grammatical errors. 1
Every time a trial lawyer defends a position inconsistent with his
beliefs, he flies right in the face of the consistency hypothesis. Some
lawyers have suggested that one should lie to himself-deceive his
psyche-to avoid the inconsistency; others insist on dropping the case;
and others automatically go forward with an obvious lack of conviction
and certainty. The solution to this problem is not easy, if at all possible.
Source credibility has also been found to be directly related to ob-
jectively irrelevant factors. The idea that people generally make use of
their ability to understand the objective character of a presentation, and
thus act in keeping with its rational requirements, has been seriously
undermined by Aronson and Golden. They designed an experiment to
investigate the relative effectiveness of objectively relevant and ob-
jectively irrelevant aspects of communicator credibility. A speech, ex-
tolling the virtues of arithmetic was recited to sixth-grade students by
one of four communicators:
a. high relevant and high irrelevant credibility (a white engineer);
b. high relevant and low irrelevant credibility (a Negro engineer);
c. low relevant and high irrelevant credibility (a white dish-
washer);
d. low relevant and low irrelevant credibility (a Negro dish-
washer).
The results indicated that both relevant and irrelevant aspects of
credibility are important determinants of opinion change. There was a
strong tendency for the engineers to be more effective than the dish-
washers. But, there was also a strong tendency for those students who
were prejudiced against Negroes to be underinfluenced by the Negro
10. R. ROSNOW and E. ROBINSON, EXPERIMENTS IN PERSUASION 3 (1967).
11. B. Greenberg and P. Tannenbaum, Communicator Performance under Cognitive
Stress, 39 JOURNALISM Q. 169-78 (1962).
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communicators, and for those students who were unprejudiced against
Negroes to be overinfluenced by the Negro communicators. -12 In light of
the experiment by Aronson and Golden, and other experiments like it,
they suggested that the following conclusions could be made:
1. In general, a white communicator will be more effective than a
Negro communicator of equal relevant credibility. This pre-
diction is based upon the assumption that more members of an
audience will have negative attitudes toward Negroes than to-
ward Caucasians, thus diminishing the credibility of the Negro
and reducing his overall influence.13
2. The more negative an individual's attitude toward Negroes is,
the less will he be influenced by the Negro communicator
regardless of the objectively relevant credibility of the com-
municator.' 4
The experiment of Aronson and Golden, and the conclusions to bederived from it, are consistent with the independent hypothesis of
Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall who noted that:
[C]redibility and like terms do not represent attributes of com-
municators; they represent judgments by the listeners .. .There
is no such animal as a perfectly credible communicator, although
there may be a few persons willing to accept absolutely anything
some other special person says. 15
What does it mean to the trial lawyer that objectively irrelevant
factors may affect his persuasiveness, or that "credibility represents
judgments by the listeners?" It means that the intentional selection of
one's listeners is a major step towards establishing credibility, and that
the trial lawyer must carefully screen the panel members of a jury if he
decides not to waive it. The trial lawyer must determine whether a
prospective juror is a member of his, or his client's or his adversary's
racial, social, political, or other human encounter group; or whether he
is a member of a group that has some attitude or prejudice which would
influence their reaction to the evidence and issues in the case. Some-
times, a good trial lawyer will refuse to take the case of a client because
the objectively irrelevant aspects of his persuasiveness outweigh the
objectively, relevant.
Though persuasion should depend on what a speaker says and not on
12. Aronson, supra note 6, at 146.
13. Id. at 137.
14. Id.
15. C. SHERIF, M. SHERIF and R. NEBERGALL, ArTrrunE AND ATrnTUDE CHANGE, 201-02
(1965).
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what people think of his character before he begins to speak, it simply
does not in many instances. This is what Emerson meant when he wrote:
"What you are speaks so loudly I cannot hear what you say." Fortunately
or unfortunately for the passive parties in a lawsuit, social psychologists
and lawyers tend to agree.
It is interesting to note that lawyers are not the only source of com-
munication in a trial. Witnesses are always a source who may also,
because of what they are, speak so loudly that the jury cannot hear what
they say. This proposition is implicit in the forms of impeachment. Why
else would prior convictions that do not involve moral turpitude-and
most do not-be admissible for impeachment purposes? And how much
does a witness's reputation in the community predetermine what he is
going to say? Moreover, it is naive to believe that a witness's race or
appearance does not reflect on his credibility. For these reasons alone, it
is imperative that a lawyer determine before trial what witnesses he is
going to call; whether he is going to use cumulative witnesses; and at
what point in the order of the witnesses he is going to call his client to
testify, if at all. It is further suggested that a lawyer should talk with his
witnesses-about their dress and appearance in the courtroom. Life style
is a sensitive issue, but so are the consequences of a civil or criminal
trial.
II. THE MESSAGE
Both sides of a controversy are presented to a jury which has no prior
familiarity with the issues involved. This system, designed to resolve
controversies in the fairest manner possible, has recently been examined
by social psychologists. One experiment was conducted by Chester Insko,
who used the prosecution and defense arguments in a summarized law
case to determine the normative behavior of an audience under circum-
stances similar to those of a jury in court. He gave four different com-
binations of communications and counter communications, much akin
to a direct examination, a cross, a redirect, and a recross; Insko con-
cluded that when a one-sided communication was followed by a one-
sided counter communication, opinions were no more influenced by the
first than by the last.' If the communications were equally strong,
perhaps the first communication moved the subjects' opinions a given
amount in one direction-while the last communication moved their
16. C. Insko, One-sided Versus Two-sided Communications and Counter-communica-
tions, 65 J. ABNORM. SOC. PSYCHOL. 203-06 (1962).
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opinions the same amount in the opposite direction. As a result, their
final opinions would have ended up right where they were.' 7 Of course,
juries never end up right where they were. They are persuaded one way
or the other for many reasons, even assuming the communications are
equally strong (which is an unrealistic assumption in most cases). But
it is interesting to note that the trial procedure is designed to give no
unfair advantage to either the first or second party where the order of
examination is concerned.
A. The Order of Presentation
The more intriguing question is one that was posed by the social
psychologist F. H. Lund more than forty-five years ago. He asked: if
both sides of a controversial issue are presented successively, which has
the advantage-the side presented first, or the side presented last? When
the first side has the greater impact, we call this primacy. When the last
side is more effective, we call this recency.
In an experiment intended to answer this question, Lund presented
mimeographed, counter-balanced communications to groups of college
students. Each communication presented the pros and cons of such
issues as whether all men should have equal political rights, whether the
protective tariff is a wise policy for the United States, and whether
monogamous marriage will continue to be the only socially accepted
relation between the sexes. The students completed an opinion ques-
tionnaire two days before the communications and again immediately
after each communication. Lund observed that when the students re-
ceived both sides of an issue, the side presented first consistently had an
advantage over the side presented last. On the basis of this observation
he enunciated the controversial principle we know today as the "law of
primacy in persuasion.' '1 8 The principle of primacy, briefly stated, is
the tendency of humans to develop strong beliefs, highly resistant to
change, upon first impression.
Subsequent investigations by H. Cromwell indicated Lund overstated
his law. Instead of primacy, Cromwell found that recency-the tendency
of humans to remember best that which they have heard last-was the
dominating factor.' 9 And late in the 1950's, Hovland and his associates
17. RosNow, supra note 10, at 99.
18. F. Lund, The Psychology of Belief: A Study of its Emotional and Volitional De-
terminants, 20 J. ABNORM. SOC. PSYCHOL. 174-96 (1925).
19. H. Cromwell, The Relative Effect on Audience Attitude of the First Versus. the
Second Argumentative Speech of a Series, .17 SPEECH MONOGR. 105-22 (1950).
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published The Order of Persuasion, and concluded, in apparent con-
tradiction to Lund:
[W]hen two sides of an issue are presented successively by different
communicators, the side presented first does not necessarily have
the advantage. 20
In recent years, the primacy-recency problem has become the object
of increased attention. Instead of a general "law" of primacy, or recency,
we have today an assortment of miscellaneous variables, some of which
tend to produce primacy ("primacy-bound variables"), others which
tend to produce recency ("recency-bound variables"), and others which
produce either primacy or recency, depending on their utilization ("free
variables") .21
It has been found that nonsalient, 22 controversial topics, 23 interesting
subject matter,24 and highly familiar issues,25 tend toward primacy. On
the other hand, salient topics, 26 uninteresting subject matter,27 and
moderately unfamiliar issues28 tend to yield recency. And "strength" is
a free variable.., that is to say, if arguments for one side are perceived
stronger than arguments for the other, then the side with the stronger
arguments has the advantage whether he goes first or last.29
Because of the importance of the opening and closing arguments in a
trial, these experiments on primacy and recency have been examined by
trial lawyers. Some cases, to be sure, are inherently "strong" for one
side or the other; and assuming equal communications, the "strong"
side will have an advantage in the opening whether the opening is given
first or last-and the "strong" side will have an advantage in the closing
argument whether the closing is given first or last. However, many cases
that go to trial do so with equally pressing arguments on each side;
otherwise they would have been disposed of or settled. With this as a
given, it is then the nature of the case that will determine the impact
20. C. HOVLAND, THE ORDER OF PRES NTATION IN PERSUASION 130 (1957).
21. RoSNOW, supra note 10, at 101.
22. Rosnow and J. Goldstein, Familiarity, Salience, and the Order of Presentation of
Communications, 173 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 97 (1967).
23. R. Lana, Controversy of the Topic and the Order of Presentation in Persuasive
Communications, 12 PSYCHOL. REP. 163-70 (1963).
24. R. Lana, Interest, Media, and Order Effects in Persuasive Communications, 56
J. PSYCHOL. 913 (1963).
25. R. Lana, Familiarity and the Order of Presentation of Persuasive Communications,
162 J. ABNORM. SOC. PSYCHOL. 573-77 (1961).
26. Rosnow, supra note 22.
27. Lana, supra note 24.
28. Lana, supra note 25.
29. R. Rosnow, R. Holz, and J. Levin, Differential Effects of Complimentary and
Competing Variables in Primacy-Recency, 69 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 135-47 (1966).
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an opening or closing argument will make on the jury. If a case is
inherently dramatic, interesting, and not too technical-such as an
emotionally contested divorce, a savage murder, or a rape-it will tend
toward primacy.., and the party to open first has a distinct advantage.
Cases that are not interesting, lack color, and are dull or highly technical
-such as a condemnation proceeding, a tax claim, a dispute over title
to real property-tend toward recency . . . and the party to close last in
such a case has the advantage.
It is interesting to note that in many jurisdictions the plaintiff in a
civil case, and the prosecution in a criminal case, opens first and closes
last. If a case should tend toward primacy, the plaintiff or prosecution
has the advantage of opening first; and if a case should tend toward
recency, the plaintiff or prosecution has the advantage of closing last.
It follows that in all cases in those jurisdictions, where there is no free
variable, the defendant is at a distinct disadvantage with respect to the
order of the opening and closing.
However, the defendant's disadvantage may be offset in some in-
stances. A defendant is entitled to open and close when in his pleadings,
he has admitted the cause of action pleaded and sets up an affirmative
defense or cross demand.30 Under some provisions he is to be accorded
such right when, after the issues of fact are settled and before the trial
commences, he admits that the plaintiff has a good cause of action except
so far as it may be defeated by the defensive matter.31 In criminal cases,
in some states by virtue of statute or rule of court, a defendant not
introducing testimony is entitled, by himself or by counsel, to open and
conclude the argument.3 2
Just as jurors are affected by the order of an opening and closing,
they are affected by the order in which evidence is presented-whether
it be testimonial, documentary, or real. For example, jurors tend to
remember evidence which is presented first and that which is presented
last; they tend to forget the evidence which is presented in the middle.83
Almost without exception, leading trial tacticians advise a case should
be started with a strong witness and ended with a strong witness. 4 Even
during the examination of a single witness, the jury's maximum at-
30. 2 Am. JUR. Admissions § 70 (1958).
31. Id.
32. 21 AM. JuR. Criminal Cases § 73 (1958).
33. T. Parker, Applied Psychology in Trial Practice, 12 FED. OF INSUR. COUNSEL 6
(1962).
34. Id.
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tention will be at the beginning of the examination, and at the end. 5
As can be seen, the law of primacy and the law of recency affect more
than the tendency of humans to develop strong beliefs, highly resistant
to change, upon first impressions. The "laws" affect memory as well.
The relevance of this is obvious enough: a presentation is useless unless
the jury remembers it.
Since final deliberations have a tendency to depend almost exclusively
on the memory of the jury, the following "laws of memory" should be
noted. Juries tend to remember:
a. that which has meaning to them;
b. that which is familiar to them, or at least that which in some
way can be associated with something they already know or can
easily learn;
c. those items of evidence they can fit into an overall picture;
d. that which is vivid; and
e. that which is repeated.
B. Emotional Appeal v. Rational Presentation
Is an emotional appeal as effective as a rational presentation? Social
psychologists can not come to an agreement. An experiment conducted
by George W. Hartmann indicated that an emotional appeal may be
the more effective.38 An experiment conducted by F. H. Knower indi-
cated that a rational presentation may be the more effectivea 7
Trial lawyers have their own ideas about appealing to the sympathies
or intellect of the jury. Some of these are required by law. As a general
rule, appeals to sympathy "may not enter the jury box, nor be heard
on the witness stand, nor speak too loudly through the voice of coun-
sel."' 8 It is, therefore, improper for counsel to appeal to the sympathy
35. Id.
36. During the election campaign of 1935, the city of Allentown, Pennsylvania, was
divided for experimental purposes into three types of wards:
1. an "emotional" area in which all the resident adults received leaflets written in
vigorous advertising style urging support of the Socialist ticket; 2. a "rational"
region, in which a more academic type of persuasion was used; and 3. a "control"
district where nothing was distributed.
The increase in the minority party vote was greatest in the "emotional" wards,
next largest in the "rational" wards, and lowest in the "control" wards.
G. Hartmann, A Field Experiment on the Comparative Effectiveness of Emotional and
Rational Political Leaflets in Determining Election Results, 31 J. ABNORM. SOC. PSYCHOL.
99-114 (1936).
37. F. Knower, Experimental Studies of Changes in Attitudes: A Study of the Effect of
Oral Argument on Changes of Attitudes, 6 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 315-47 (1935).
38. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1934).
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of the jury, either directly or indirectly, as, for example, by asking the
jury in a personal injury action to put themselves in the plaintiff's
place; 39 nor may counsel ask the jury if they would want to go through
life in the condition of the injured plaintiff,40 or would want mem-
bers of their family to go through life crippled.41 In a few cases, lawyers
arguing to juries have attempted to invoke sympathy by speaking, with-
out justification in the evidence, either eulogistically or disparagingly
of third persons who may have been casually connected with the case
or the parties to the controversy. This conduct is always improper.42
Likewise, it is generally considered improper for an attorney, in his
argument in a personal injury case, to ask the jury what would com-
pensate them for a similar injury.43
Notwithstanding the declared law, and the frequent admonitions of
the court, the jury's sympathies are often intentionally aroused-and
appellate courts often decline to reverse verdicts resulting from such
misconduct. 44
The impact of a sympathetic appeal is significant. Despite legal and
ethical precautions, sympathy is generally on the side of the plaintiff in
a civil case, with reason on the side of the defendant. In a criminal case,
the converse seems to be true. But the matter cannot be so simple. Just
as some criminal defendants are attractive and arouse sympathy, others
are unattractive and tend, almost automatically, to alienate the jury.
It is understandable that a jury may, on occasion, be moved by sympa-
thy to acquit an otherwise guilty defendant, but the reverse process
requires the jury out of antipathy to convict an innocent person. Kalven
and Zeisel, in a recent detailed study of the American jury, came to the
following conclusions:
1. Defendants evoke sympathy in our trials one out of every five
times. Since the sympathetic defendant causes disagreement one
out of every five times he is present, and since he is present
roughly one out of every five times, the sympathetic defendant
caused disagreement in Y5 X 1/2 5, or 4 per cent, of all
cases.
45
2. It is predicted that an unattractive defendant would have a
converse effect on the jury ... that is, where the judge acquits,
39. Id.
40. Morrison v. Carpenter, 179 Mich. 207, 146 N.W. 106 (1914).
41. Hughes v. City of Detroit, 161 Mich. 283, 126 N.W. 214 (1910).
42. 53 AM. JUR. Appeals to Sympathy of Jury § 496 (1958).
43. Wells v. Ann Arbor R.R., 184 Mich. 1, 150 N.W. 340 (1915).
44. Hazelrigg Trucking Co. v. Duvall, 261 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1953).
45. KALVEN, supra note 4, at 217.
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the presence of this factor will at times induce the jury to dis-
agree with the judge and convict.46
It is fair to say that the jury is responsive to the individual defendants
in a criminal action, and to the individual plaintiffs in a civil action. To
put it another way-sympathy affects jury decisions. The intriguing
issue that arises from this is what sort of presentation should an advocate
make if his case or his client is sympathy-oriented. Emotional appeal
or rational presentation? This question raises ethical issues as well as
the problems of one's approach at the message stage. The answer-there
is no answer-is determined by one's role conception, by the role one
assumes as an advocate.
C. The Manner of Presentation (In the Courtroom)
Trial lawyers have written an infinite amount of material on the art
of advocacy, or as some social psychologists would have it, the art of
persuasion at the message stage. Call it what you will, their authority
in this area cannot be doubted. Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to give a systematic and detailed exposition of what trial lawyers
consider persuasive advocacy, some discussion is in order. The areas to
be covered in brief outline form are those areas trial lawyers consider
to be the critical stages of persuasion-the opening, direct examination,
cross-examination, and the closing.
It will be assumed throughout the following discussion that an ef-
fective presentation of a case is preceded by a vast amount of prepara-
tion. Implicit in this assumption is an investigation of law and fact, the
selection of witnesses and evidence, planning the order of the witnesses
and the examination of each, considering the potential objections,
choosing between jury and non-jury trial, and considering the argu-
ments to be urged and the final points to be made; preparation also
means interviewing witnesses and clients, taking statements, attending
conferences, and examining all papers, contracts, letters, and files.
1. The Opening: Even though the purpose of the opening is merely
to introduce the nature of the controversy, trial lawyers insist that maxi-
mum headway can be made at this stage. Their reasons are founded on
the law of primacy-that is, an idea or fact once accepted by the jury in
the opening statement of a case has a tendency to become more fixed as
46. Id.
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time goes by, and the longer it stays, the more difficult it is to dislodge.
As a general rule, the case should be opened in a calm, deliberate, and
dignified manner, since this is not an argumentative stage of the pro-
ceedings. There is enough opportunity for argumentation in the direct
and cross-examination of the witnesses, as well as the closing. However,
this is not to say the opening should be made without imagination and
conviction, or without the absorbing quality of the storyteller's art.
In opening, the plaintiff should introduce to the judge and jury the
parties to the litigation and then proceed with an outline of his case.
His manner should be his own, his style sincere, and his attitude, one
of fair play. Finally, he should state the law in his own terms if it is
necessary to give the jury an understanding of his theory. (Case law
indicates an advocate has the right to do this).47
Since the plaintiff's counsel has the advantage of making the first
opening address to the jury, it follows that the defendant's attorney
must be prepared with a strong persuasive argument of his own. He
must convince the jury that his client has a meritorious defense, either
as to liability or to damages, or both, and that he too is worthy of belief.
The content of the defendant's opening statement should include the
names of the parties and their background; the form of action; a re-
statement of facts; and the essence of the defense. The manner of the
defendant's opening, like the manner of the plaintiff's, depends on the
facts of the case, and of course, the nature of the advocate.
2. Direct Examination: After the opening, the advocate must pre-
sent his case. Direct examination is not an exciting phase of the trial,
nor is it one in which the subtle arts and consummate skills of an ad-
vocate are made apparent to the jury-however, its importance cannot
be overemphasized. Francis Wellman made the following comment
about direct:
If the direct examination is properly and skillfully conducted, the
impression thus made by an honest witness is more lasting than
any argument of counsel. The vivid story of a single witness told
in a winning way will leave a first impression upon a juror's mind
that no eloquence can efface. 48
And Robert Keeton, a law professor at Harvard University, is no less
convinced of the importance of the examination-in-chief.
47. Pallas v. Crowley-Milner and Co., 334 Mich. 282, 54 N.W.2d 595 (1952); Cf.
Lafrenz v. Stoddard, 50 Cal. App. 2d 1, 122 P.2d 374 (1942).
48. WELLMAN, supra note 1, at 142.
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[M]ore cases are won by evidence produced on direct than by that
revealed in cross-examination.4 9
The basic purpose of direct examination is to present evidence in its
most favorable light and at the same time impress the judge and jury
with its accuracy and truthfulness. This is no easy task. What witnesses
should you call? In what order? Should you use cumulative witnesses?
Should you call the adverse party? At what point in the order of wit-
nesses should you call your client to testify? Should you use leading
questions? Should you not? Should you offer harmful evidence on direct
examination? Should you purposely offer evidence of doubtful ad-
missibility? To what degree should you prove qualifications of an
expert? How should you introduce secondary evidence? Should you
react obviously to the testimony as it is given? Should you permit or
encourage your witnesses to use gestures to convey their meaning? To
what extent should you use demonstrative evidence? Should you call
upon the witness to make diagrams, drawings, or computations on a
blackboard or paper during his testimony?
No hard and fast rules can be laid down. No two lawyers will present
a case in the same way. What is effective for one is ineffective for an-
other. But take it as a given that no good trial lawyer walks into the
courtroom with these questions unanswered.
In summation, the following points are considered fundamental, but
essential, to the art of direct examination.
a. A good direct examination requires an understanding of wit-
nesses and human interaction and "games people play." Some
witnesses are clever, wise, and tricky; others are diffident,
scared, or ignorant.
b. As each witness is called to the stand, it should be kept in mind
that he is probably in a strange and frightening environment.
It is relatively simple to put a witness at ease by asking a few
preliminary questions before going into the facts in issue.
Questions as to where the witness lives, how long he has lived
there, how he is employed, etc., are the type that put a witness
at ease because the answers are spontaneous.
c. Once the witness is relaxed (if possible), and the foundation is
laid, narrative questions are generally required since the ten-
dency of people is to adopt the suggestion of the person or side
they want to help. However, this general rule does not apply to
a witness who is diffident, unresponsive, hostile, or unable to
49. KEETON, TRiAL TACrICS AND METHODS 7 (1954).
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communicate-such witnesses should be carefully led through
their testimony.
d. If the evidence of one's own witness is unfavorable because of
hostility or surprise, the authorities suggest the following
course of action.
(1) Do not exhibit the slightest sign of displeasure since
this will only add to the bad effect.
(2) Never abandon the witness entirely. This intensifies the
damage done and gives the impression of complete de-
moralization.
(3) Calmly ignore the adverse statement and quickly in-
quire into something new, even if unimportant, and
attempt to tone down and soften the adverse impressions
made.
3. Cross-Examination: When cross-examining an adversary's witness,
the examiner generally assumes the witness is in error-or is lying. The
witness, on the othe.- hand, assumes he is not mistak n, rcsents an attack
upon his testimony, and despises an attack upon his person. It is no
wonder that cross-examination is considered the most exciting and
colorful phase of a trial.
Cases are won and lost every day at the cross-examination stage, and
that which distinguishes a good cross-examination from a bad one is
probably experience. Only experience can give an advocate that sixth
sense which tells him when he has reached dangerous ground, when he
should advance, when he should retreat, and when he can risk his case
upon a single question. Even the most gifted require many years of
training and careful observation to arrive at anything approaching
perfection. But to.say that only practice can breed perfection in any art
is to deny the value of precepts.
Before an advocate rises to cross-examine a witness, he must ask him-
self whether the witness has testified to anything that is material against
him; whether the testimony has injured his side of the case; and ulti-
mately, whether one should cross-examine the witness at all. When a
witness does testify to material facts which injure an advocate's position,
it becomes the advocate's duty to break the force of it. His method of
doing so will vary with the nature of the testimony and the character
of the witness. Whether a witness has made an honest mistake or is in-
tentionally lying, the testimony of the witness may be attacked in any
one of the following ways: by showing conviction of crime; by showing
hostility, bias, or adverse financial interest; by showing prior incon-
sistent acts or statements; by showing poor reputation for truthfulness;
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by showing lack of knowledge or perceptive capacity; by rebuttal evi-
dence.
As a general rule, cross-examination should be done with quiet dig-
nity and absolute fairness to the witness. The reason for the "gentle-
man's approach" is that the jury's sympathies are invariably on the side
of the witness, and juries are quick to resent any discourtesy toward him.
Furthermore, the jury is aware that witnesses generally take sides when
they come into court and exaggerate if they have to. But to them, this
does not equal perjury or lying, and they are generally right. More
often than not it is unintentional error and imagination rather than a
designed misrepresentation. It is the duty of the cross-examiner to
separate imagination from memory, and fact from inference. Any more
is a dangerous tactic.
However, suppose a witness is lying under oath and is destroying an
advocate's position because of it. Though there is no effective substitute
for experience or ingenuity in this area, the following techniques have
proven useful:
a. Encourage the witness to go in the direction he thinks you do
not want him to. Soon nobody will believe what he is saying-
"a liar is not to be believed even when he speaks the truth."
b. If the witness appears to be speaking from rote memory, jump
jump him around and make him repeat the middle, the be-
ginning, and the end. Once you disclose the fact that the wit-
ness is not honestly mistaken, no further questions need be
asked.
4. The Closing: The importance of the closing argument is founded
in the law of recency-that is, humans tend to remember best that
which they have heard last. It is not enough for the record to sustain
the verdict on its face, or for the jury to listen to the testimony pre-
sented. The facts of the case on final argument must be connected. This
means preparation. Though the final summation cannot be prepared
until all of the testimony in a case has been presented, initial prepara-
tions must be begun as soon as the case is retained and continued to the
trial date.
Like the opening and forms of examination, the closing will depend
on the nature of the case and the personality of the advocate. Particular
attention should be paid to the closings which are recency-bound, which
are salient, uninteresting, or complex. Recency-bound cases must be
woven into a consistent and logical pattern to be remembered; the facts
401
Duquesne Law Review
must be re-emphasized, their relation to one another revealed, and their
probability affirmed.
The question arises: which of the four stages of a trial is the most
important? Some trial lawyers say the opening since it is the opportunity
to make a lasting impression on the jury. Others say the direct examina-
tion, because it is the first stage for presenting evidence. Some say the
cross-examination, for it is here the adversary's case is destroyed. Still
others say the closing as it is the final effort and the one to be remem-
bered.
There is no definite answer or general rule in this area.50 How can
there be? The facts and problems of each case differ; the juries differ;
and the lawyers differ.
But trial lawyers do agree that the opening, the examination, and the
closing of a case must be handled as an art, not a science. 51 This means
that the effective use of language and voice is critical. Language is the
medium. And voice-need it be said-is the most persuasive means of
communication known. The hardest tears, the gayest laughter, and the
deepest logic have been provoked by tone-in openings, direct exami-
nations, cross-examinations, and closings.
III. THE RECIPIENTS
[T]he audience should be in the right frame of mind in lawsuits
-when they are feeling friendly and placable, they think one
sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think
something either totally different or the same thing with a dif-
ferent intensity; when they feel friendly to the man who comes
before them for judgment, they regard him as having done little
wrong; when they feel hostile, they take the opposite view.
Aristotle52
Indeed how could anything be more important than the selection
of the men who are to decide the case? It matters not how thorough
one may have been in preparation; it matters not how good a case
50. This conclusion was derived by interviewing one-hundred trial lawyers. The
question they were asked, among others, was "Which of the four stages of a trial (and
they were mentioned) is the most important?" There was absolutely no consistency, which
is consistent with the written works of great advocates.
51. This observation is in no way intended to undercut the importance of understand-
ing the correlation between social scientific findings and effective trial techniques dis-
cussed at length in this commentary.
52. Aristotle as quoted in STRYKER, THE ART OF ADvocAcy 145 (1954).
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one may have-unless he selects the proper kind of men to decide
it, he is bound to have a mistrial or a defeat.
Francis L. Wellman 53
Can the background characteristics of juries and judges be connected
with their decisions? Trial lawyers tend to think so. Their theory is that
individual background characteristics can be connected with attitudes
and opinions which ultimately influence, and in some instances dictate,
the verdict. In selecting a jury, trial lawyers advise to mark their employ-
ments, their methods of earning a living, their social positions, and their
age.
Many propositions and rules of thumb have resulted from the vol-
umes trial lawyers have written on jury selection. They contend that
retired businessmen are usually fair but disinclined to give good ver-
dicts; 54 railroad men and their wives are excellent jurors;55 persons of
Irish, Jewish, Latin American and Southern European extraction are
more desirable as jurors than people of British, Scandinavian, or
German extraction; 56 women are desirable if the principal witness
against the defendant is a woman;57 new jurors are more desirable than
experienced jurors.58
Connecting individual background characteristics with decisions,
attitudes, or opinions has been a major achievement of modern social
science research. It has often yielded stunning results. I will cite just
one example. The classic study of voting,59 made during the Willkie-
Roosevelt campaign of 1940, produced data which provided a basic
insight into the structure of the American electorate. The study linked
voting behavior to three background characteristics: religion, economic
status, and size of community.
The classic study of voting answered the question: can a correlation
be established between background characteristics and decision-making
in a national election? The parallel question is: can a correlation be
established between jury backgrounds and decision-making in trials?
Kalven and Zeisel answered this question with respect to criminal trials.
Their answer was a "quick no."60 Social psychologists tend to agree with
53. WELLMAN, supra note 1, at 111.
54. APPLEMAN, SUCCESSFUL JURY TRIALS 122-28 (1952).
55. Id.
56. H. ROTHBLAr'r, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES IN THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES (1961).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. LAZARSFIELD, BERELSON and GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE 16-27 (1944).
60. KALVEN, supra note 4, at 465.
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Kalven and Zeisel. Many factors have been reported to be correlated
with persuasibility, and the interplay of even one factor is infinite.
Rosnow and Robinson give this example:
[I]t is as plausible to assert that the factor of intelligence is posi-
tively correlated with persuasibility as it is to assert a negative
correlation, or even no correlation. On the other hand, the more
intelligent a person, the better able he is to comprehend the issues.
The less intelligent person, because of his limited comprehension,
is less susceptible to persuasion on complex issues. On the other
hand, the more intelligent a person, the greater is his critical
ability, and the less he is influenced by persuasion.6 1
Since the interplay of the factors which affect persuasibility is infinite,
it is suggested that any systematic determination of what makes one
individual more subject to a persuasive appeal than another is impossi-
ble to validate empirically. It seems that the voir dire-the institution
for sifting out unfavorable jurors--can not be effective for the reason
lawyers think it is effective. In other words, it is not effective if it is
used to correlate jury backgrounds with decision-making. A lawyer
simply can not anticipate the infinite factors in a juror's background
which will affect his thinking and persuasibility. Even assuming he
could, there are several reasons why many factors in a juror's back-
ground could not be elicited. First, most people will not admit, even to
themselves, that they may be biased or prejudiced. Second, legal rules
preclude many questions from being asked. Third, there is the danger
of offending. And fourth, there is always the possibility that a venire-
man is not telling the truth.
This is not to say that the voir dire stage of a trial is not a persuasive
stage. The effect of a first impression on jurors is significant. This first
impression is made during the voir dire of the jurors, not at the time
of the opening statement, and certainly not at the time the first witness
testifies.6 2 The fact that the opening statement is really the second event
in the trial, and that the first witness's testimony is the third or fourth
event, is often overlooked. The voir dire is the first event and this is
the time when the first impression is made. The voir dire, of course, can
not be a substitute for the opening statement, but when the trial lawyer
has completed the voir dire examination, the jurors have already devel-
oped their first-impression beliefs.
61. RosNow, supra note 10, at 198.
62. 31 AM. JUR. Evidence § 136 (1958).
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I A trial lawyer may decide he does not want a jury as his legal audi-
ence. Then, of course, it will be the judge. Kalven and Zeisel made a
concentrated effort to determine the magnitude of the disagreements
between judge and jury in criminal and civil cases. In the criminal area,
their empirical data indicated the jury is less lenient than the judge in
3 per cent of the cases and more lenient than the judge in 19 per cent
of the cases. 63 Thus, the jury trials show on balance a net leniency of
16 per cent. In other words the defendant fares better 16 per cent of the
time before the jury than he would have in a bench trial. 64 Another
way of stating this is the jury acquits in 33 per cent, and the judge in
only 17 per cent, of all trials. However, it was strongly emphasized that
this figure must not be made the basis for a general probability cal-
culus by any defendant, because the cases to which this 16 per cent
applies have been selected for jury trial because they are expected to
evoke pro-defendant sentiments. 65
In the civil area, the magnitude of any disagreement between judge
and jury was found to be less significant. Kalven and Zeisel concluded
that in some 47 per cent of all civil cases, the judge and jury find in
favor of the plaintiff on liability, and in some 31 per cent find for the
defendant, thus producing the over-all agreement on liability to 78 per
cent.6 6 Also, it was established that in 12 per cent of the civil cases it is
the jury that will be more favorable to the plaintiff, and in 10 per cent
of the cases it is the judge who will be more favorable to the plaintiff.67
This finding confirms the popular expectation that the jury in personal
'injury cases favors the plaintiff, at least if that expectation is taken to
mean that the jury is more likely to favor the plaintiff than is the
judge.68 It is also interesting to note that once liability has been found,
the jury's damage award is on the average about twenty per cent higher
than that of the judge.69
IV. THE CHANNEL
The means of communication in the courtroom may take the form of
testimony, and documentary or demonstrative evidence. The question
is which channel is the most effective? Is it testimony, or is it real evi-
63. KALVEN, supra note 4, at 59.
64. Id. at 59.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 64.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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dence which "speaks for itself"? When should photographs be used?
Charts? Motion pictures? Spectacular experiments? Social psychologists
and psychologists and lawyers, of course, have concerned themselves
with these issues.
For years social psychologists attempted to rank the various means of
communication in the order of their potency, but finally concluded that
it could not be done. To social psychologists, the ultimate answer to
the question "Which channel?" can only come after the communicator
carefully considers the problem at hand, his desired aims, and the re-
sources available to him. In the end, a subjective kind of optimum
"efficiency index" will guide his decision. ° In other words, it is for the
communicator to decide how he can achieve the greatest impact within
the bounds of his available resources.
Psychologists have been more helpful to the trial lawyer in this area.
After much experimentation, they have concluded that the following
percentages represent the amount of learning accomplished by each of
the five senses (This is a general average which applies to the average of
all situations):
Sight .............................................. 85%
H earing ............................................ 10%
T ouch .............................................. 2%
T aste .............................................. 1% 0/%
Sm ell .............................................. 1Y %
In light of these statistics, the following suggestions have been made:
(1) The sense of sight should be used to the maximum in presenting
material. 71 (2) Since our juries are made up of individuals who are not
segregated in accordance with their ability to learn, the more senses
which are stimulated, the better the chances for all of them to learn.7 2
In certain situations, the sense of hearing, touch, taste or smell could
be a major channel for stimulation. For instances, a liquor bottle found
in a wreck might be exhibited to the jury and smelled by them.73 (3)
Material must be presented in a logical, meaningful, striking and stim-
ulating manner, using visual aids, demonstrative evidence, and other
interesting experiences to make intense impressions on the jury.74 (4)
If a lawyer keeps in mind that the maximum attention of the jury is at
the beginning and end of a case, and that 85% of what they learn will
70. ROSNOW, supra note 10, at 373.
71. Parker, supra note 33, at 6.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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be through their eyes, he can be sure the jury will learn and remember
the facts as he wishes them remembered, and render their verdict ac-
cordingly.7 5
Trial lawyers, like social psychologists, are well aware that there is
no ultimate answer to the question "Which channel?" However, in
light of the experiments by psychologists and from their own years of
experience, they have made certain definite conclusions with respect
to the several means of communication available to them.
First of all, they have concluded that the persuasibility of real evi-
dence ranks above oral testimony. It is common knowledge that two
witnesses standing side by side observing the same event will differ in
their statements concerning what happened. It has been suggested that,
"in general, when the average man reports events or conversations from
memory and conscientiously believes that he is telling the truth, about
one-fourth of his statements are incorrect, and this tendency to false
memory is the greater the longer the time since the original experi-
ence." 76 Furthermore, it is one thing to have the opportunity of obser-
vation, or even the intelligence to observe correctly, but it is still
another to be able to discribe it intelligibly and accurately.
With the foregoing as a given, law professor Robert Keeton came to
the following, generally undisputed, conclusion:
[T]he lawyer who has more of real or demonstrative evidence than
his adversary has a distinct advantage in the contest of convincing
the jury.77
Keeton, in his text on trial tactics and techniques, suggested that all
favorable physical or demonstrative evidence that is available be used.78
His only caveat was to avoid the use of "spectacular demonstrations
that bear only a slight relation to the material issues of the case, or are
inconsistent with evidence rules of your jurisdiction."7 9 Keeton added
further that it is good practice to call upon the witness to make dia-
grams, drawings, or computations on a blackboard or paper during his
testimony. Not only is this a more accurate presentation, it has the
distinct value of preserving an idea, or an expression, so that the jury
may turn back to it for study and comparison, and to refresh their own
memory of the testimony.80
75. Id.
76. WELLMAN, supra note 1, at 161-62.
77. KEETON, supra note 49, at 73.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 74.
80. Id. at 75.
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Real evidence is any tangible object presented for inspection to the
trier of fact. It includes bullets, knives, guns, blood tests, photographs,
x-rays, and tape recordings, as well as diagrams, drawings, and computa-
tions. A form of communication which is of special interest at the pres-
ent time-because of its persuasive impact-is the motion picture.
Coupled with a narrative, the film is well adapted to unfold a vivid
series of actions, events, or incidents. In depicting situations that have
actually occurred, it excites the imagination and emotions through the
senses. In some respects the motion picture is even better fitted than
testimony to exhibit the time-relation of events. For instance, two events
significantly related to one another and happening simultaneously
may be brought before the jury with telling effect in almost an instant
of time, while in a narrative lengthy successive explanations would be
required to make clear their proper relation. Of course, a proper foun-
dation would have to be laid for the admission of a film, just as it would
for the admission of any real evidence.
There is one other channel of communication in the courtroom that
cannot properly be classified as testimonial or demonstrative evidence.
For purposes of this section, the following forms of persuasion will be
called "wordless persuasion" and will include physical proximity,
position, gestures, facial expressions, and non-linguistic aspects of
speech. These forms of persuasion are generally unintended, but if one
is aware of them, a skilled performance need not be left to chance. In
essence, be aware that physical proximity triggers intimacy; know that
a person who is higher up than another is in a somewhat dominating
position; consider the fact that gestures, whether voluntary or not, are
social techniques intended to communicate definite meanings; control
facial expressions since they manifest all emotions; don't overlook the
fact that eye movements have an effect quite out of proportion to the
physical effort exerted, and that they play an important part in sustain-
ing the flow of interaction; finally, control the pattern and flow of re-
marks and silences for these cues are revealing to observers.8 ' These
forms of persuasion are not used in isolation, but are integrated into
one's technique and style, which should be a persuasive one.
CONCLUSION
When I was a young man, not skilled, and overmatched by my
opponents, I lost many cases that I should have won. But as I be-
81. ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 32-37 (1971).
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came older and more skilled and my opponents showing up were
tyros, I won many cases that I should have lost. So in the end, jus-
tice was done.
An Advocate8 2
The purpose of this article was to present some experiments con-
ducted by social psychologists in one of their major areas of specializa-
tion. The importance of correlating these experiments with the methods
and theories of trial lawyers should be self-evident. The literature of
social science reflects many new insights about human behavior and
communication, and influencing attitude and opinion change is what
trial work is all about.
As long as the adversary system is with us, those versed in the art of
persuasion will win cases they should not have, and tyros will lose cases
they should have one. The morality of this is an independent issue and
a question for everyone. It is suggested, however, that the adversary
system presents no serious problem as long as those who hold themselves
out as advocates are in fact advocates. Implicit in this is a knowledge
of persuasion.
How much confidence can we have in the generality of the laboratory
findings? There is no absolute answer, of course. It would be presump-
tuous to expect all problems that deal with human interaction to be
amenable to an empirical analysis. Nor can all propositions concerning
communication and opinion change even be submitted to experimental
tests-for example, when a controlled analytical experiment shows a
given factor to be significantly related to communication effectiveness,
the question still remains as to the generality of the relationship. But to
deny the significance of laboratory findings is to deny reality, and in a
sense, is to deny the effective assistance of counsel. Why not know those
factors which go into credibility? Why not know that certain cases are
primacy-bound and others are not? Why not be aware of the impact
one makes at the voir dire stage since it is the first encounter with the
jury? And why not use every bit of real evidence available if it will
help your case? This is not to say that present day juries are not com-
posed of practical people accustomed to think for themselves, experi-
enced in the ways of life, capable of forming estimates and making
distinctions. But jurors, and judges, are people-and all people can be
persuaded. And it is an advocate's duty to do just that.
82. F.L. BAILEY, THE DEFENSE NEVER RESTS 262 (1971).
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